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panel 241811 x 181811
of trustees national gallery of art washington D C few artists in the
1470 1528

european tradition have communicated the agonies of corporeality
grunewalds depictions of the crucifixion of
grunewaldt
more powerfully than gicinewalds
christ the wounds from the crown of thorns and the lashing are promi
aromi
nent the cross is expressively bowed from the twisted distortions of the
hands and feet that emotionally express christs agony and the actuality
of the sacrifice the dark background emphasizes christs bleakness and
loneliness and the body is the receptor for christs pain and suffering
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philosophical arguments regarding divine embodiment
philosophical arguments purporting to prove
that the concept of an embodied god is incoherent are themselves logically uncompelling

though the earliest christians believed god to be embodied
thinkers within the classical christian tradition have for centuries
reasoned that on logical grounds god must be incorporeal with108
in this final section 1I meet these thinkers on
out body or parts 208
their own terms apart from the historical arguments of the preceding two sections I1 examine the most common rational arguments against divine embodiment and show that none of them is
sufficient to prove gods incorporeality hence no such argument
ought be a stumbling block to rational acceptance of the father
and the son as embodied persons
the pattern of reasoning that these philosophical arguments
typically follow was set out by anselm as early as the eleventh cen201
tury 209
anselm defines god as that than which none greater can
be conceived from this general definition he deduces not only
that god exists by means of his famous ontological argument
but also what god is like in particular he argues that x is the
greatest conceivable being logically entails x is incorporeal it
will be helpful to outline his position in some detail before using
refuted below
it as the main representative of the arguments reftited
christians nonetheless affirm that god the son was incarnate in
the person of jesus of nazareth was crucified and raised from the dead and
exists now everlastingly with a resurrected though gloriously transformed
body these views apparently conflict for if god must be incorporeal then the
resurrected christ cannot be god the problem can be expressed in terms of an
inconsistent triad 1 jesus of nazareth exists everlastingly with a resurrected
body 2 jesus of nazareth is god and 3 N if x is god then x is incorporeal
the conjunction of any two propositions of the triad entails the negation of the
third in this section 1I argue that 3 is false if my argument is successful it
removes possible stumbling blocks to rational acceptance of both the incarnation
and the resurrection
111.
209s
S N deane trans
ill
ili
lii
iii open
lasaile
lasalle 111
saint anselm basic writings lasalie
chs 2 7788
court publishing 1966 achs
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208many
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in defining the term greatest conceivable being anselm
makes it clear that by conceivable he does not mean psychologically
imaginable otherwise gods greatness would not exceed the limits of human thought rather by greatest conceivable being he
means a being than which no greater being is logically possible
As to what he means by greatest anselm explains that the
greatest conceivable being would lack nothing that is good and
would be whatever it is better to be than not to be contemporary
commentators have plausibly suggested that in this context the
value terms greatest good and better are best understood as signifying religious values according to this view when anselm
refers to the greatest conceivable being he means that than
which a no more worthy of worship is logically possible the formula is often shortened to the most worthy object of religious
worship or the most adequate object of religious attitudes 1I will
take these shortened formulae to be equivalent to that stated by
anselm this bit of analysis provides the backdrop for six separate
arguments for divine incorporeality which I1 will now examine

the argument from divine infinity
from the formula x is the greatest conceivable being
anselm first derives x cannot be limited in any way As a rationale
for Ans
anselma
elms conclusion J N findlay argues that it is
anselms
wholly anomalous to worship anything limited in any thinkable manner for all limited superiorities are tainted with an obvious relativity
and can be dwarfed in thought by still mightier superiorities in which
process of being dwarfed they lose their claim upon our worshipful
attitudes and hence we are led on irresistibly to demand that our relishould tower infinitely above all other objects 210
gious object

from the inference that god cannot be limited in any way anselm
concludes that god cannot be corporeal he argues
is
but everything that is in any way bounded by place
less than that which no law of place
limits since then nothing is greater than thou no place
contains thee but thou art
everywhere

can gods existence be disproved in the ontological
argument from st anselm to contemporary philosophers ed alvin plantinga
garden city NY doubleday 1965 116 italics in original
1I
111j
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for altogether circumscribed

is that which when it is wholly
in one place cannot at the same time be in another and this is seen
to be true of corporeal things alone but uncircumscribed is that
which is as whole at the same time everywhere and this is under-

stood to be true of thee alone

211

Ans
anselma
elms argument can be summarized as follows
anselms
1

god the most worthy object of religious worship

2

the most worthy object of religious worship cannot be limited in any way

3

4

if god were corporeal he would be limited in that he could
not be as a whole at the same time everywhere
hence god cannot be corporeal 1 2 3

premise 2 if it is understood literally
anselm himself cannot consistently affirm it for if god were
absolutely unlimited he would have to be the whole of reality and
thereby not the creator god of theistic theology who is ontologically distinct from his creations and who gives his creatures some
measure of independence from himself it is the existence of the
creator god I1 take it that anselm is attempting to prove similarly
if god were not limited in any way god could not possess any
determinate attributes either positive or negative for example if
god were immutable he would be limited in that he could not be
mutable or if he were atemporal he would be limited in that he
could not be temporal indeed findlay suggests that an absolutely
unlimited being may well entail a deific absence of anything definite but anselm employs his deity formula to generate some eighteen divine attributes
Find
findlays
lays assertion that it is absolutely anomalous to worship
a being limited in any thinkable manner seems to imply mistakenly
that a limitation as limitation is thereby a defect but surely this
assertion depends on the nature of the limitation obviously a limitation in something that is not admirable such as ignorance selfness or cruelty would be a good thing anselm makes it clear
ish
ishness
that the greatest possible being would be absolutely unlimited only
in every admirable or great making attribute but even here we
have long recognized that it is possible to have too much of a good
As a first objection to

21deane
deane basic writings 19 20
21
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thing A virtue taken to excess may become a tragic flaw one may
be too trusting too generous or too helpful limitations as limitations are value neutral moreover not all values especially in
their superlative form are logically compossible such as unlimited compassion and unlimited bliss 212 nor do all great making
properties or perfections admit of completion for example the
virtue of veracity admits of completion but an attribute such as
creativity does not thus divine perfection cannot coherently be
understood as being complete in all respects
no doubt what anselm
anseim meant or should have meant then is
2 the most worthy object of religious worship must be unlimited
in every respect in which to be so a is possible b is admirable
and when conjoined with other excellences c maximizes worship worthiness hereafter 1I shall use WWM short for worship
worthy maximizing to denote conditions b and c but if in
Ans
anselma
elms argument one replaces premise 2 with 2 the argument
anselms
is no longer valid

the argument from divine omnipotence
now in order to try to make anselms
Ans elms argument work 1I shall
anselma
wiil
win
have to supply some additional premises more specifically 1I will
need to show some particular respect in which god must be
absolutely unlimited that is both possible and WWM and at the
same time incompatible with his being corporeal it may seem
that unlimited power or omnipotence would satisfy these conditions that is it may seem that the following proposition is true
5

it is both possible and WWM to be absolutely unlimited in power

using 5 one can construct the following argument for divine
incorporeality
1

god the most worthy object of religious worship

2

the most worthy object of religious worship must be
absolutely unlimited in every respect in which it is both pos
sible and WWM to be so

5

it is both possible and WWM to be absolutely unlimited in
power

Hartshome mans
charles hartshorne
charies
alans vision of god and the logic of theism hamden conn archon books 1964 1 56
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N if x is corporeal then x is not absolutely unlimited in

power
7

hence god cannot be corporeal

the symbol N signifies a purported necessary truth
true and the first
omnipotent in the
sense of having absolutely unlimited power the answer is clearly
negative indeed the logical paradoxes generated by the notion of
absolutely unlimited power are well known for example the notion
seemingly entails the incoherent conclusions that god could create
a stone so large that he could not move it or that he could simultaneously create both an irresistible cannonball and an unbreakable
215
211
lamppost 213
to salvage a rationally coherent view of god thinkers
have been compelled to opt for definitions of omnipotence considerably more restricted than its etymology would suggest recently
for example anthony kenny has proposed that omnipotence be
understood as the possession of all logically possible powers which
it is logically possible for a being with the attributes of god to possess where attributes refers to those properties of godhead
which are not themselves powers 214
given kennys
dennys proposal how can the attributes that god possesses be determined if these are to be determined by christian
revelation and if this revelation confirms that god the son has a
resurrected body then omnipotence must be understood in terms
of the logically possible powers that are also logically possible for
an embodied god to have so understood there would be no conflict between divine power and divine embodiment
if on the other hand the divine attributes must be ascerAns
tained by reasoning from Anse
elms
eims
anselms
anselma
ansehns
hns formula one must ask 1 how
much power must the most worthy object of religious worship
possess and 2 could an embodied being coherently possess that
much power
I1 must now consider whether premise 5 is
question I1 must ask is Is it possible for god to be

3214
1214

for further explication of the problems with absolutely unlimited power
2for
ifor

see kent E robson omnipotence omnipresence and omniscience in mormon
theology in bergera line upon line 67
75
6775
aanthony
2anthony
anthony kenny the god of the philosophers oxford clarendon
1979
98
197998
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when we consider the first question it seems evident that
from a religious point of view the matter of gods power relates to
our practical needs for individual help protection and preservation we look to god for forgiveness of our sins and for power to
repent for strength to cope with and to be refined by our adversities for comfort in our trials and above all for salvation and eternal life we trust that gods power is sufficient to satisfy these
needs and expectations and to fulfill all his purposes and promises
for this to be assured it seems as if god must be supreme and have
power over all things so that no one or no thing can thwart the fulfill
fillment
ment of his will
the term almighty can be used to refer to the power described
scri bed which is how the third lecture on faith describes gods
omnipotence this lecture delineates gods character as described
in revelation and then explains why this character is necessary for
the object of religious faith of omnipotence it says
an acquaintance with these attributes in the divine character

is

essentially necessary in order that the faith of any rational being can
center in him for life and salvation for if he did not in the first
instance believe him to be god that is the creator and upholder of
all things he could not center his faith in him for life and salvation
all his
ali
ail
for fear there should be a greater than he who would thwart an
plans and he like the gods of the heathen would be unable to fulfill
his promises but seeing he is god over all from everlasting to everlasting the creator and upholder of all things no fear can exist in the
minds of those who put their trust in him so that in this respect their
faith can be without wavering 319 italics in original

ff
if 1I grant and it seems I1 must at least from the perspective
of the ordinary believer that in order to be the most worthy
object of religious worship it is necessary that god be almighty
must 1I also grant that his power is sufficient it seems so gods
worship worthiness connects most essentially with his personal
and moral attributes holiness loving kindness compassion long
suffering justice equity and veracity these attributes are faithfully and steadfastly expressed in his personal dealings and
relations with us as father creator savior exemplar and friend his
power is also relevant but only to the extent that it is needful to
accomplish those ends that he as a perfectly loving and righteous
father freely chooses to suppose otherwise is to affirm that
power itself has something worship worthy about it quite apart
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from the good ends it makes possible that some may in fact value
or even worship power for its own sake I1 dont doubt but such
worship is neither religiously nor morally required
if my reasoning is correct then it is neither possible nor WWM
for god to be absolutely unlimited in power and thus proposition
5 is false but my analysis also supplies the following more satisfactory alternative to 5
5

the most worthy object of religious worship

must be almighty

next to make Ans
elms argument work one must also show
anselma
anselms
8

N if x is corporeal then

x is not almighty

but the truth of 8 is by no means self evident some further premises
must be supplied to show why a corporeal being cannot be almighty
Ans
anselma
elms argument suggests a possible connecting link that is his
anselms
argument suggests that if god is almighty he must be omnipresent
and that if he were omnipresent he could not be corporeal with
Ans elms argument
these claims 1I can again reconstruct anselms
anselma

the argument from divine omnipresence
the argument can now be stated as follows
1

god

5

the most worthy object of religious worship

9

N if x is almighty then x is omnipresent

10

N jf
omnipresent
iipresent then x is not corporeal
if x is onu

11

hence god cannot be corporeal

the most worthy object of religious worship
must be almighty

to properly

evaluate this argument one must understand
more clearly what is meant by the claim that god must be
omnipresent anselm suggests that if god is omnipresent then he
is present as a whole at the same time everywhere this notion is
less puzzling when considered in its religious setting perhaps the
idea is nowhere better captured than in the hymn of the psalmist
lord thou hast examined me and knowest me
aff
ali whether 1I sit down or rise up
ail
all
thou knowest ann

where can I1 escape from thy spirit where can I1 flee from thy presence
if 1I climb up to heaven thou art there

https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol35/iss4/5
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if I1 make my bed in sheol again I1 find thee
if I1 take my flight to the frontiers of the morning or dwell at limit of
the western sea
even there thy hand will meet me and thy right hand will hold me
fast psalm 1391 2 7 10 new english bible

religiously the affirmation of gods omnipresence is the
assurance of gods constant watchful care his loving awareness
of all that is transpiring and his ability to intervene in human history and in our individual lives to fulfill his purposes and
promises thus it seems that divine omnipresence is crucially
related to his power and knowledge and that if he is almighty then
he must be omnipresent
this understanding brings me to consider premise 10 Is it
true that an embodied being could not be omnipresent the question has recently been carefully examined by grace dyck
211
she correctly points out that the claim an embodied
jantzen 215
being cannot be omnipresent is ambiguous between his body is
not everywhere which I she says is true but harmless and he
11216
216
fless
harmless
is not everywhere which is not necessarily true 73216
the harn
truth follows analytically from the meaning of the word body
by definition a body is spatially locatable and can be in only one
place at one time but if a being is omnipresent there is no place
where it is not thus it appears that the notions of omnipresence
and corporeality are mutually exclusive 217
dyck debuts
rebuts this conclusion by carefully analyzing the meaning of the relevant sense of presence and then derivatively of
omnipresence most critical to her analysis she shows that 1 it is
not the case that 1I am present only in the volume of space occupied by my body and 2 to be present at x means most essentially to be aware of what is going on at x and perhaps to be able
to some extent to influence it in support of 1 a person would
surely say of a speaker addressing the senate that he is present in
the senate chambers even though it is not the case that the spatial
1

grace M
215grace
studies 13 1977

omnipresence and incorporeality religious
85 91 my thinking on the issues discussed in this article has
been significantly aided by dycks article and her later book grace M jantzen
gods world gods body
216
2i6yck
dyck omnipresence and incorporeality 90 91
217
217dyck
dyck omnipresence and incorporeality 85 86
215
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coordinates of his body are coextensive with those of the chambers and as to 2 how would a senator who slowly falls asleep as
a bill is read and remains so throughout the ensuing debate correctly answer the question were you present when the measure
was considered or suppose a hearing on a bill to eliminate veterans benefits is held in a hospital ward of comatose veterans could
218
hearing218
they correctly be said to be present for the hearing
on the basis of her analysis dyck concludes that if god has a
body that is spatially locatable
loca table somewhere in the universe and if
from that position he knows and is able to influence everything
that is going on then he could properly be said to be omnipresent
if this conclusion is correct then premise 10 is false and the argument from omnipresence fails
but one may still feel constrained to ask how would it be
causally possible for god to be spatially located in the universe and
yet be aware of and able to influence all that is going on I1 dont
know this 1I take it is a question for the theologian or for future
revelation but perhaps two brief suggestions will shed further
light first dyck points out that modern
modem mathematicians have
shown that three dimensional geometry is not the only possible
geometry indicating that it is merely a limitation of our conceptual
structure that we perceive only three spatial dimensions dyck
thus conjectures that god may occupy or be localized in dimensions outside our ordinary experience from which he may express
his thereness in every part of the universe 219 second a glorified
body may be the source and locus from which emanates the divine
spiritual influence everywhere in the world

the argument from divine indestructibility
anselm suggested a further argument for incorporeality when
he wrote
for whatever

of parts is not altogether one but is in
some part plural and diverse from itself and either in fact or in concept is capable of dissolution but these things are alien to thee than
whom nothing better can be conceived of 220
is composed

my illustrations are similar to and suggested by those of dyck
219
219dyck
dyck omnipresence and incorporeality 90
220
220deane
deane basic writings 24
22111my
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Ans elms
eims reasoning
ofanselms
anselma
the following seems to capture this line of
anselms
1

god

12

the most worthy object of religious worship cannot be

the most worthy object of religious worship

destructible in fact or in concept

x is composite
N
if x is composite then x is destructible in fact or in concept
ntfx
hence god cannot be corporeal
N if x is corporeal then

13

14
15

when we consider premise

12 it seems evident that the most

worthy object of religious worship cannot be destructible in fact
argumendo
argu endo that a corporeal being would be of
and let us grant arguendo
necessity in some sense be composite what about premise 14
Is it true that whatever is composite is thereby destructible in fact
platos phaedo notes that natural or physical bodies are composite
and are often observed to be destroyed through a process of
decomposition 221 from this observation it is concluded that all
bodies being composite are likewise destructible this conclusion of course does not deductively follow and even if all natural bodies are liable to decomposition it does not follow that a
divine body is finally even if a divine body were not inherently
indestructible it would not follow that god could not everlastingly
sustain that body in being in sum 1I find no conceptual incoherence either in the notion of christs body being raised incorruptible or in the notion of an incorruptible body per se
Ans
anselma
elms worry that a body even if not
but what about anselms
destructible in fact would nonetheless be destructible in concept
are all bodies destructible in concept I1 suppose this depends on
our concept if a body is thought of as merely a composition of little bits of matter then it seems as if its being decomposed can be
imagined on the other hand if a body especially a divine body is
thought of in other terms such as a force field the idea of its being
decomposed is not so readily grasped but even if we granted that
the destruction of any body is consistently thinkable what difference would it make our faith in god and in his promises is ultimately grounded in the integrity of the divine will and character
and not in the mesh of conceptual necessity thus it seems that
divine indestructibility does not require incorporeality
plato phaedo 78b 80c
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the argument from divine self existence
owen provides two additional arguments against divine
corporeality he claims that corporeality is logically incompatible
with both self existence and moral perfection his argument from
R
H P

divine self existence is very tersely stated
gods incorporeality can also be proved from his self existence

no material entity can be self existent for each is a determination or
mode of being consequently we can always ask of any such entity
222
what are its causes and conditions222
conditions 11222

his argument seems to be this
1

god

16

the most worthy object of religious worship must be self

the most worthy object of religious worship

existent
17

N if x is self existent then x is not a determination or mode

18

of being
if god were or had a material body he would be a determination or mode of being

19

hence god cannot have or be a material body

premises 17 and 18 seem open to doubt or at least in need
of clarification concerning 17 owen has not explained what he
means by a determination or mode of being but apparently
he means something like a species or category of being but as
contrasted with what totally undifferentiated being if so it
seems that 17 proves too much for personality as well as corporeality appears to be a mode or determination of being by parity
of reasoning then it would follow that a personal being could not
be self existent but 1I see no basis for such a claim owen apparently provides the following argument for premise 17

of any determination or mode of being

1

one can always intelligibly ask what are its causes and conditions

2

of a self existent being

3

hence

one can never intelligibly ask what
are its causes and conditions
a self existent being cannot be a mode or determina-

tion of being
H
ME

P

owen concepts ofdeity
deity london macmillan 1971
of defty
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premise 2 appears to be analytically true and 53 apparently follows from 1 and 2 but premise 1 seems questionable what
one can intelligibly ask for example without self contradiction is
a function of the syntax and semantics of ones language for example the reason why a person cannot intelligibly ask about the
causes and conditions of a self existent being is that self existent
simply means without cause or condition premise 1 does not
appear to be analytically true if 1I understand determination or
mode of being correctly it does not grammatically imply must
or could have a cause whether some particular mode or determination of being is caused or uncaused is dependent on the nature
of reality not on the meaning or structure of language thus it
seems this support for premise 17 fails and so the premise
remains inconclusive the argument from self existence thus fails
225
221
to prove that god must be incorporeal 223

the argument from moral perfection
owens

final argument for divine incorporeality is based on
the claim that pure spirit is the most perfect form of being he says
moreover if a dualistic view of mind and matter is correct we can see
not only that gods pure spirituality is possible but also that it is the
most perfect form of being all human behavior approaches perfection to the extent that it expresses wisdom goodness and love yet
although the body aids these spiritual properties in so far as it offers a
medium for their expression it also inhibits them in many and some
tragically frustrating ways hence only pure spirit can constitute an
absolutely perfect form of personal existence 224

his argument can be summarized as follows
1

I

god

20

the most worthy object of religious worship must constitute

the most worthy object of religious worship

an absolutely perfect form of personal existence

only pure spirit can constitute an absolutely perfect form of

21

personal existence
ordinary believers do not believe christs resurrected body to
be self existent since its history began on the first easter morning rather they
affirm that the divine person who rose from the dead on that easter morning is
self existent and antedated both his resurrected and mortal bodies it is perfectly
consistent to think of god as a self existent person with some acquired properties
224
121
124
owen concepts of deity 19
223
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N jf
if x is pure spirit then x is incorporeal

23

thus god cannot be corporeal

93

owen acknowledges that the cogency of this argument
depends on the cartesian view that mind and matter are ontologically distinct a view he does not attempt to justify but owen
admits that unless it can be validated there is no basis for affirming
pure spirituality in god since the concept could not be given any
referent or reference range it is significant to note that most contemporary arguments for divine incorporeality do not consist of
positive arguments for it but rather attempt to salvage the notion
of a totally unembodied deity from charges that incorporeality
is either cognitively meaningless logically incoherent or contraindicated by the weight of psychological physiological and other
evidence 1I will not rehearse the arguments and evidence here
suffice it so say that the cartesian anthropology on which this
argument rests does not appear to be rationally compelling
argu
endo that there could be a totally unembodied
arguendo
assuming argumendo
mind why should this be considered the most perfect form of personal existence owen suggests that human behavior approaches
perfection to the extent that it expresses wisdom goodness and
love and that the body inhibits these spiritual properties in
many and some tragically frustrating ways unfortunately
owen does not explain just how the body acts as or constitutes
such an inhibiting agency personally I1 find the idea hard to grasp
certainly the body is not an independent agency that might override decisions or choices made by the mind might it then somehow be the source of all those desires or wants that may incline or
tempt one to choose contrary to that which is wise good or lovail these negatives to the body and nothing but
ali
all
assign
ing but to as
signall
honorific attributes to the mind seems entirely gratuitous and without ground in reason or experience ironically in orthodox christian theology the most maliciously evil person satan is also
supposedly an unembodied mind or pure spirit it seems much
more reasonable to predicate all attributes praiseworthy and
blameworthy to the person not to disparate parts of the same
but suppose we grant that a body is a causally necessary condition of ones ability to feel certain desires or inclinations such as
https://scholarsarchive.byu.edu/byusq/vol35/iss4/5
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the desire for food or sexual gratification assuming that such
desires and inclinations are not intrinsically evil would they
nonetheless necessarily inhibit a person from always choosing
rightly 1I dont see why the new testament describes the mortal
jesus as one who was tempted in all points such as we but without
sin it might well be wondered whether one who has fully confronted temptation in all its forms and guises and who has conquered
them all is not more worthy of admiration and worship than one
who has never experienced a conflict it seems then that premise
21 is false and for all the reasons given this argument too fails to
demonstrate that god must be incorporeal
in sum it appears that none of these typical arguments for
divine incorporeality considered here is sufficient to prove it thus
none of them ought be a stumbling block to rational acceptance of
the father or the son as embodied persons

conclusion
joseph smith revealed the doctrine that god is embodied
beginning even before he organized the church in 1830 As evidenced in the writings of influential early christian thinkers the
earliest christians widely believed in an embodied god and that
belief persisted into the fourth and fifth centuries but was lost
thereafter the rational arguments of classical christian immaterial
ests
ists however fail to demonstrate that god must be incorporeal
hence neither historically nor philosophically compelling reasons
modem revelation that
exist for christians to doubt the message of modern
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